Ka Leo o ka Lahui, Volume II, Number 216, 16 June 1891 — Correspondence. [ARTICLE]

Correspondence.

We are. not in anv responsible for ihe statements or views oi correapontlentF. : "THRPLAX." | Edltor Ka Leo.—Under tbe above appears an article in vour issue of 12th inst„ discussing the poliiieal future of this country. The arguments used either directly or by implication in favor of ultimate political annexation to the United States are strong, and for the niost part, unansuerable. There are, however, reflections" against commercial with Canada, whieh the facts will not warrant. But leaving Canadiah possibilities out; of the question, it is as clear as the sun at noonday that the iogic of events/ both commercial and political, points to an entire change cf our political system as the only escape, not only from the state of discontent and uncērtainly of wars and rumors of wars so prevalent during the pass four years,—but to insure the existence of the Nation as a home for civilized people of whatever race. Assuming this to be the fact the ehoiee [from the standpoint of self-interest] lies between commercial reciprocity with Canada, embodying differential customs duties in favor of these islands [whieh, however, would be independent of any radical change of the system" of po!itical government, and to that extent be elaim- - «ed by opponents as only a temporaryTēliefJ, and (2) Politicat annexation to the United States. Passing over for the present a eomparison of the disadvantages, or otherwise, of tbese two plans, there remains [suppose neither should be adopted] the inevitable tendency of drifting in the direction ofa (1) Bntish protectorate, or what wculd be equally as bad a Crown Colonv, or (2) a r !zerainty of the Japanese Empire. In discussiug the two latter alternatives, we must not confuse the Canadian and»the British ideas — the one being merel3% a commeroial problem for the proposed be■nefit,of the planting [and consequently of all domestic] interests. and, by relation, tending to remove some of the existing causes of poJitical discontent; tne other, though in a sense political, vet, abandon■ing bpth the commercial and political expansioti prosperity or independence, as the result of foreign dictation.. Firstly,—Gieat Britain is the greatest maritime power in existence from both a c®mmercial and miiitarv stand-point. The immense development whieh oommerce on the Paciflc is now undergoing and whioh must continue to add marts of commerce of the Orient, the Occident and t\ie Austml cont4nents must give to that o6«itry whieh seeures thia plaee as M33n outpost the supremacy of the PioUk. Mhaa tolo«o*er«»2 and navaloperatiottB. | m data ] M a hypotta» 8| *^teofcessity <

for securing connecting links in * strong line of communication be5 tween the two greatest eountries comprising *'Greater Britain," for ; both steain and electricity render ; these Islands a!most as l4 necessary" to England as were Egypt and the »Suez Oanal. ' And the history of British diplomacy tells us that this political necessity will be solved by poiitical absorption, unless stronger co,unteraeting influences are interposed. This latter contingoncy depends, upon causes, chief among whieh |are (a) the probability of a similar political necessity aroUsing the United States to positive action in the same direction; and (b) polili-co-domestic influences in Hawaii, whieh may tend to aid one of these schemes "to the detriment or exclusion of the others. If the United States had a ' 4 vigorous foreign policy," we could tell exactly what the result would be; but although her claims are tenfold stronger than England's, there is among the great mass of her citizens, a feeling strongly averse to everything smacking foreign political eomplicatiOns. On the other hand "domestic" influences in Hawaii are tending rapidly against the American idea, and in favor of the British; always excepting the American i>lantation and eoi^mercial L interests, whieh must of C0urse foresee safety stability in an-: nexation, as against ruin and po-1 litical confiscation in case of a Crown Colony— in proof ®f whieh: the history of Jamaica and other i Crown Colonies, similarly situated | a're eloquent and forcible examples. | It is also safe to say that these influ- i ences exist almost soleiy in "high; places". — Among them, comesi | first the great change in the | known sentiments of the reign!ing sovereign from those of the late King. Many argue whilei

admitting this fact, that forthei very reason her Majesty ean be more easily influeneed, and therefore the change matters iittle. But this argument is a doubie-edged sword. Experiences show that where people in high places ean be 4t infiuenced," it is generally by reason of a weakness of ©haracter whieh prefers personal favorites and servile flatterers without regard to merit or even respectability. Then we have the gradual diminution of tne number of intermarriages between American men and Hawaiian women, and the corresponding increase of marriages of native women to British subjects. This may be from the fact that many Americans have been obliged to leave the country, being crowded oat by eheap labor—not of the Chinese element. lt is well known, that all the British eommercial and planting mterepts in the islands refuse employaient to Americans. and that on soine plantation, so controlled, American lunas, teamsters and mechanics have been recently discharged aad their situation given to fresh amvals from England, brought in spēci&Uy to eupply the places of the citi&ens of a country upon the bounty of whoee government these very planters have been fattening for years. Thpn see the prospect of a youn& girl, the daughter of a British subject, studiously kept uway not only frora the United States, but sent away from her native H«. waii whiie yet a child, to prevent her from aoqauring cny of tb* Ainer!caxi 1 i&fiufiices n thea iman^

ing tbe Court f anel educateci in Eugland wiih ihe object [or at any rate. with thc efifeetj of imbibing anti-Araeric&n sentiments — and butone' life between this young girl and the Hawaiian throne t Shonld the future succession bceome an accompli8hcd fact, what might we not expect iii the time of atiti-Araerican po3itical action ? especially as it is everywhere recognised that the prestent strain on that entity known as government * eannoi exist mueh longer as it is without something giving away 1 More than thie, it is .no secret that certain of the present Cabinet are so strongly prejudicēi. agsinst Americans and American institutions that although grown rich upon the bounty of that governmeut in the shapejf differential sugar daties. they yei so eoueh fear their families naay imbibe American senti» ments that they send their ehildren to England, Germany and Australia to be educated. Secondly.—The Jaoanese problem. The appallmg condition now exists of the presence among us of over 20,000 people of this nationality, four fifths of whom are able-bodied male adults. These people, should onee obtain the franchise, would outvote all thei halanee of the voting- population. i And the end is not yet; they are ! still coming in at the rate of ai thousānd per month; and, there| are now in our midst more Japanese eapahle ofbearing arms. than j the entire balance of the inhahitants of all other nationalities, if i we except nnly the Chinese. Added to this, they already have what is practically a state within a state,* in the way of special rules, with the forceof law, administered by Japanese ibspectors and officials of various grades chosen and sent out by the Japanese government, and although paid out of the Hawaiian treasury, responsible only to Japan for their ollieial conduct. | Tae Japanese are neither servile I nor submissive; but are eourageoUs j resentful and vindictive, when they think themselves wronged. Ther« is ī,ositiVely no provision, and it is doubtful if there is any practicable or possible ī»eans for coping with any considerable movement whieh might at any moment be precipitated hy these people. In short any state of dissatisfactioit among them, whieh might result in overt acts, would plaee the entire country absoluteiy at their mercy. But tbis is not the worst. Japan demanded of the k, Reform" ministry, shortiy after tiie revolution of '87, that Japanese in Hawaiishouid have the same rights of franchise as the most favored foreigners, although the number of Japanese then in Hawaii was small comparwith the present, the government were so timid that they leinporized, instead of meetiug the question squarely; and by a kt with word8" the foreign minister (with a fear of withdrawal of Jftpan* ese contract coohw and consequent interferenpe with the eheap labor I idea) induced the Japanese govemiaicnt fa beliove that the Hawalian (TOvernment (or legislatnre) would change that article of the constitution whieh exelixdes Asiatics from the franthise, so as to allow Japan> ese to register and vote the aame as Americans or £nglishmen, Japan was pushing ihia Goverament very hard to theee luiaea, when the mphUkm in that

farther agitation of the.'.-stitfj$ct. But when things hēeamo nwe settled, the que$tion Was ;igjain pressed. An envoy was serft by Jthe Cum-. min's cabinet to try and stave the matter off. The ar;swer is a further importation of over a thousand coolies a monih, with thtf inform&tion (as eommon report. saith) that|the envoy succeeded in mollifying the Japanese into delaying immediate action, by farther promises as to change :in our constitution, favorable to Asia,tic full citizenship. Are we in a position to face this threatened conflscation of our political rights single-handed ? or does not the very essence of our future sa&ty, lie in some strong political allianee — not a 4< troops-clause" — whieh will inaure against submi Mon to or sūbversion by aggressive law makers whether civilized or barbarian, issuing their ukases from the antipodes, without regard to the wishes or wellfare of our people, and consulting only the interests of an imnenal policy in whieh we Hawaiian, of whatever race, have no manner of eoneem. Ifthen a tithe of the facts on whieh the above cenclusioris rest be true —and they are for the most part matters not only of eommon notoriety, but susceptible of judieial proof—it would seem the only remedy is annexation pure and «imple, tothe U nited States. It does not follow as Ka Leo sugge$ts that the sovereign will be led to "aceept a ehange," by any ureasonable and conscientioss discussion of our present condition. The system of government in Russia is good enough for the Czar. Political reforms always eame from the people. But supposing the abuses now existing should be righted as soaae still continue tb hope by the ballot — a«d suppose also that political dangers other than domestic should dissolve themselves and leave the Hawaiian people master ef their own destiny, then why should the policy of the goy2rnment not include an effort to obtain through a treaty ofcommerce with Canada that whieh has laiely been taken from us bv the operation of the McKinley Bill in the United States. With Ka permission this queātion~ wlll l>e1 called up later on. Bystajjdkr.